
























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
The Sick Pay Trap









Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research 
 
Simen Markussen 
Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research 
 
Knut Røed 













P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 














The Sick Pay Trap
* 
 
In most countries, employers are financially responsible for sick pay during an initial period of 
a worker’s absence spell, after which the public insurance system covers the bill. Based on a 
quasi-natural experiment in Norway, where pay liability was removed for pregnancy-related 
absences, we show that firms’ absence costs significantly affect employees’ absence 
behavior. However, by restricting pay liability to the initial period of the absence spell, firms 
are discouraged from letting long-term sick workers back into work, since they then face the 
financial risk associated with subsequent relapses. We show that this disincentive effect is 
statistically and economically significant. 
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1  Introduction 
Based on  extensive reviews of disability prevention experiences in 13 countries, OECD 
(2010, p. 125) argues that “employers are key players in preventing health problems at work 
and facilitating a swift return to work for people absent from work due to sickness.” But, 
while there is ample empirical evidence regarding the responsiveness of absenteeism with 
respect to worker incentives (Henreksson and Persson, 2004; Johansson and Palme, 2005; 
Ziebarth and Karlsson, 2009), there is little evidence regarding the impact of firm incentives.  
OECD (2010, p. 133) notes that countries where employers are responsible for a large share 
of their employees’ sick pay costs tend to have much lower absence rates than countries 
where employers can pass the costs on to the public purse, and also that absenteeism has 
dropped significantly in the Netherlands and UK after a shift of financial responsibility to-
wards employers. Yet, to our knowledge, scientific evidence establishing a causal relationship 
between firm incentives and worker absenteeism is non-existent. The design of firm incen-
tives with respect to sick-leave prevention also involves a potential tradeoff between sick-
leave and labor market exclusion: While more extensive pay liability (or experience rating) 
improves incentives for absence prevention, it may at the same time undermine incentives for 
employing persons perceived to have a high risk of absence in the first place.  
Although the extent of employer co-payment differs sharply across different countries, 
the incentive structure faced by employers in most industrialized economies typically implies 
that the firm is responsible for sick pay expenditures during an initial stage of a workers’ sick 
leave, but that the national insurance scheme (or another insurer) covers the costs accruing 
after some duration threshold (OECD, 2010, Table 5.1). This means that firms do have finan-
cial incentives to prevent short-term absences. However, in cases where absence spells stretch 
beyond the co-payment period, employers may (rightly) think that it is not in their interest to 
facilitate a quick return to work, since the return to work also entails the risk of new short-
term absences for which the employers are again financially responsible. Hence, current in-
centives structures may have the unintended side-effect of discouraging employers from ex-
erting appropriate effort to curb long term absenteeism, effectively trapping long-term absen-
tees in inactivity. 
In the present paper, we examine empirically the impacts of employers’ pay liability 
by exploiting a reform in the Norwegian sick leave insurance scheme, whereby pay liability 
for workers’ short-term sick-leaves was removed for pregnancy-related absences. The motiva-
tion for this reform was that it was feared that the elevated risk of sickness absence associated 4 
 
with pregnancies made employers reluctant towards hiring young women. Markussen et al.  
(2011) show that the increased risk of absenteeism associated with pregnancies is indeed sub-
stantial; the hazard rate of entering into a sick-leave spell with a diagnosis predicting full ex-
ploitation of the employer’s pay liability is raised by a factor of five at the onset of a pregnan-
cy and further to a factor of 15 during the last 2-3 months before delivery.  The reform thus 
clearly removed a potentially important disincentive with respect to hiring young female la-
bor; but at the same time it also changed employers’ incentives to prevent sick leave among 
pregnant workers. On the one hand, the reform made short-term absence less costly for the 
firms. On the other hand it also made it less risky to let long-term absent pregnant workers 
return to work, since the firms no longer were responsible for the costs associated with subse-
quent relapses. Hence, the reform offers a neat setting for identifying the impacts of firm in-
centives: If firms actually influence their employees’ sick leave behavior and respond to fi-
nancial incentives, we would expect short-term sick leave to rise and long-term sick leave to 
fall in response to the reform.  
Based on a combination of regression discontinuity and difference-in-difference me-
thodologies, we find that the reform had significant impacts on the affected employees’ ab-
sence behavior. The hazard rate into sick-leave spells for which pay liability was removed 
rose by around 5 percent, while the corresponding recovery hazard dropped by around 4 per-
cent, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, the recovery hazard from (longer term) spells that never 
were subject to pay liability rose by 9 percent, as the expected cost from new sick leave epi-
sodes was removed. All these results are exactly as one would expect on the basis of simple 
economic theory, provided that firms do have some influence on their employees’ sick leave 
behavior. Our findings thus indicate that policy makers indeed may have good reasons to fo-
cus on improving employer incentives in their efforts to curb absenteeism. Restricting firms’ 
pay liability to short-term absenteeism only may be a bad idea, since it has the unintended 
side effect of discouraging firms from helping long-term absent workers back into work. Inte-
restingly, our findings suggest that the Norwegian system, with 16 days pay liability for firms, 
does not reduce overall absenteeism at all, compared to a system with no pay liability – de-
spite that it allocates as much as 34 % of total insurance costs to the firms and that absentee-
ism is highly responsive with respect to firm incentives. 
We also find some evidence indicating that the removal of pay liability for pregnant 
workers made young women more employable. According to our estimates, the school-to-
work transition for young females was speeded up by around 6-8 percent as a direct result of 5 
 
the reform. This suggests that policy makers may have to trade off incentives for sick-leave 
prevention against incentives for employing workers with high expected absenteeism in the 
first place.  
2  Related literature 
When an insurance scheme is troubled by moral hazard problems, efficiency considerations 
suggest that coverage should decrease with duration. This is studied extensively in relation to 
the design of optimal unemployment insurance, starting from the seminal paper by Shavell 
and Weiss (1979). The argument is simple: In the presence of moral hazard there is an inevit-
able trade-off between insurance and incentives. By reshuffling the benefit schedule to pro-
vide lower payments tomorrow and higher payments today, agents are given stronger incen-
tives to search for jobs while their expected utility remains constant.  
Many countries have adopted declining benefit schemes for the unemployed, most of-
ten in the form a single fall after some time in addition to an overall duration limitation (Ca-
huc and Zyllerberg 2004, p. 143). Maximum duration limitations are also typically in place 
for sickness insurance payments. However, there are also examples of sickness benefits that 
increase with duration. Johansson and Palme (2005) study an example from Sweden, where a 
time-constant sickness insurance payment of 90 percent of former earnings was replaced by a 
time-increasing payment schedule, with 65 percent replacement rate the first three days, 80 
percent the next 77 days, and then 90 percent from day 80. Johansson and Palme (2005) found 
that the reform changed workers’ behavior exactly as the altered incentives would imply. The 
cost of starting a sickness spell increased, and the incidence of new spells fell. The cost of 
continuing a newly started spell also increased, and the return-to-work hazard rose according-
ly. However, for a worker having spent close to 80 days on sick-leave, the reform reduced the 
return-to-work incentives insofar as a positive probability was attached to the possibility of a 
relapse. And the return-to-work hazard fell after 80 days on sick leave. This example illu-
strates a potential benefit trap: Having reached the highest level of replacement, it is not par-
ticularly tempting to risk a return to the bottom of the replacement ladder. 
In the present paper, we focus on the employer’s incentives, rather than those of the 
employees. But, provided that employers influence their employees’ sick leave behavior, the 
story is basically the same. If the employer is financially responsible for short-term absentee-
ism only, the firm obviously has incentives to prefer a single long absence spell over many 6 
 
short ones.  And when employees have been on sick leave long enough to have exhausted the 
firms’ pay liability, the financial risk associated with possible relapses may convince the em-
ployer not to accommodate a quick return to work.  
3  Institutions and data 
All Norwegian workers are fully insured against sickness absence for up to one year, with a 
100% replacement ratio. The general rule is that the first 16 days of each absence spell is paid 
for by the employer, whereas the social security administration pays for the remaining days, 
and also for subsequent disability benefits. If a new absence spell starts within 16 days after a 
previous spell was completed it is counted as a continuation of the previous spell. This im-
plies that a new pay liability period for the firm is not triggered until the worker has been 
present for at least 16 days. The social security costs are covered through uniform payroll 
taxes; hence there is no experience rating. In April 2002, a reform was implemented implying 
that firms were entitled to exemption from the 16 days pay liability for pregnancy-related ab-
sences.  
During periods of sickness absence, Norwegian workers enjoy a special protection 
against dismissals, implying that they cannot be dismissed on grounds that are related to their 
sickness.
1 After the one year absence period, however, the firm is allowed to lay off the absent 
worker with direct reference to the sickness. Hence, if an employer for some reason wishes to 
lay off a worker – but is prevented from doing so due to the general employment protection 
regulations – the incentives for facilitating that worker’s return to work from a long-term ab-
sence spell is particularly weak. 
Norway also has a high level of absenteeism. On a typical working day, around 7 per-
cent of all workers are absent due to sickness. This places Norway among the countries with 
the world’s highest sickness absence rates; see, e.g., Bonato and Lusinyan (2007). 
The data we use in the present paper comprise complete longitudinal administrative 
records on employment and absence 2001-2005, merged with information on firms and work-
ers on the basis of encrypted identification numbers. Absence spells are recorded insofar as 
they are certified by a physician. Such certification is normally required if a spell exceeds 
                                                 
1 The burden of proof lies with the firm. In practice, this implies that absent workers can only be laid off 
as part of a mass displacement.  7 
 
three days (eight days in some firms). This implies that the occurrence of very short absence 
spells is underreported in our data. 
4  Empirical analysis 
Our empirical analysis consists of two parts. We first examine the extent to which the removal 
of firms’ pay liability for pregnant workers’ sick leaves affected these workers absence beha-
vior. We then investigate whether the reform affected young women’s employment oppor-
tunities. 
4.1  Absence behavior during pregnancies 
To examine the impact employer incentives on absenteeism we construct the following data-
set: We start out with all pregnant workers in Norway from May 2001 to December 2005, and 
follow them through work presence and work absence during their pregnancies. These work-
ers constitute our potential treatment group. For each pregnant worker, we pick a female non-
pregnant worker from exactly the same workplace, at exactly the same point in time, of ap-
proximately the same age, and with a similar earnings level.
2 These workers constitute our 
control group.  
Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2 offer some descriptive statistics. There are around 94,000 
pregnant workers in our dataset and a slightly lower number of controls (since some workers 
are controls for more than one treatment). Figure 1 illustrates that the rate of sickness absence 
has been fairly stable throughout our observation window for both pregnant and non-pregnant 
workers, except for seasonal fluctuations. The timing of the reform is marked in the figure as 
a vertical line. Based on a visual inspection of the figure, it is not easy to spot any indication 
of a reform effect whatsoever. A closer comparison of absence rates by pregnancy duration 
before and after the reform is provided in Figure 2.  Panel (a) clearly illustrates the sharp rise 
in absence rates that typically occur as the pregnancy progresses, with absence rates as high as 
60 % the last few months before delivery. Panel (b) reports the changes in absence rates from 
before to after the reform at different stages of the pregnancy for the members of the treat-
ment group minus the corresponding changes for the members of the control group. Accord-
ing to these descriptive difference-in-difference estimators, the reform apparently raised ab-
senteeism slightly at early stages of the pregnancy, while it lowered it at later stages (though  
                                                 
2 We select the co-worker with the closest income level, provided that the age difference is less than 
three years. If we cannot find a female coworker with less than 3 years age difference, the pair is not included in 
our analysis.  8 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of data used to analyze absence behavior 
  Treatment group (pregnant)  Control group (non-pregnant) 
  Before reform  After reform  Before reform  After reform 
Number of persons  25 849  68 377  24 759  66 117 
Characteristics  (means)      
Age    29.9 30.0 30.1 30.2 
Education        
Compulsory or lower secondary   14.9 12.8 16.1 14.2 
Upper secondary  29.6 28.4 29.5 29.0 
College, low level  42.7 44.2 41.6 42.8 
College, high level  9.5 11.0 9.5 10.3 
Earnings (deflated)  252 705  247 009  238 197  235 128 
Non-European  background  (%)  5.0 5.3 4.3 4.9 
Outcome  (mean)      
Absence rate (Nov.-March)  27.5  27.8  7.5  7.4 
 
the latter effect is not statistically significant). This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis 
that the reform raised the incidence of absence spells, but reduced their duration (since inci-
dence is likely to dominate at early stages of pregnancies, while duration effects become more 
important as the time of delivery comes closer). The overall absence rate for pregnant women 
rose from 27.5% before the reform to 27.8% after the reform (adjusted for seasonal variation), 
while it dropped from 7.5% to 7.4% for the members of the control group; see Table 1. A 
simple descriptive difference-in-difference (DiD) estimate for the overall reform effect meas-
ured by this outcome is thus a modest increase of 1.4 percentage points. However, this small 
change could of course easily have been explained by factors other than the reform. 
The fact that a visible reform effect does not show up in descriptive statistics does not 
necessarily imply that firms and workers did not respond to the reform. As discussed above, 
the reform not only reduced the incentives to prevent short-term absence, it also removed a 
disincentive with respect to preventing long-term absence. Hence, the overall effect on the 
absence rate is ambiguous. Given the rather subtle and potentially conflicting ways in which 
employer incentives were affected by removal of pay liability, with likely effects on the inci-
dence as well as on the duration composition of absence spells – we set up a multivariate ha-
zard rate model for transitions between the states of presence and absence, and identify the 
behavioral effects of interest on the basis of a difference-in-difference design. But before we 
turn to that model, we take a closer look at what happened at the exact time of the reform im-
plementation by means of a regression discontinuity analysis. More specifically, we examine 
the aggregate rate of entry into absence among pregnant workers during a short time window 
just before and just after the reform, under alternative assumptions regarding the underlying  9 
 
 
Figure 1. Daily absence rates 2001-2005 in treatment group (at different stages of the preg-
nancy) and in control group. Vertical line indicates timing of reform. 
 
Figure 2. Absence rates by number of months into the pregnancy. Treatment and control 
group before and after the reform (with 95 percent confidence intervals). 
Note: For control group members, pregnancy month refers to the number of months since they were picked as 
controls to a newly pregnant colleague. To prevent seasonal variation from disturbing the before/after reform 
comparison, the graphs compare workers that became pregnant in June or July 2001 (and their control group 




3 Figure 3 illustrates the basic idea. Panel a) shows how the daily sick-leave entry 
rates among pregnant workers evolved from 90 days before to 90 days after the reform. Due 
to the seasonal pattern in absence behavior (recall that the reform was implemented on April 
1), there is a declining time trend in this period. Imposing a linear calendar time function to 
control for this development yields a reform effect corresponding to the small upwards shift 
illustrated in the graph. Panel c) shows how the size of this estimated reform effect varies as 
we change the bandwidth (the number of days before/after the reform included in the analy-
sis). The shorter the time window, the larger are the estimated effects, suggesting (perhaps) 
that there was a slight scope for firms/employees to “postpone” the starting date by a day or 
two just around the implementation of the reform. The effect is statistically significant, how-
ever, regardless of bandwidth. As a sort of “placebo test”, we examine in panel e) how the 
effect estimate changes if we assume alternative false implementation dates (with bandwidth -
90,90). The graph shows that the effect estimates become smaller the further we move away 
from the true implementation date. Additional placebo tests can be obtained by repeating the 
whole estimation procedure on the control group. The results are illustrated in panels b), d), 
and f). The message coming out of these graphs is clear: There is no reform effect whatsoever 
in the control group.  
A natural objection to the regression discontinuity results presented so far is that they 
may depend heavily on the linearity assumption for calendar time effects. Table 2 shows, 
however, that the finding of a positive reform effect is highly robust with respect to the speci-
fication of the underlying time-function. The table presents results for models with from one 
to four degree polynomials in a time function assumed to be the same before and after the 
reform, and also with from one to four degree polynomials in time functions allowed to shift 
from before to after the reform (in the latter case the reported reform-effect is the shift that 
occurred at the time of reform implementation). All the results are presented for three alterna-
tive bandwidths and for both treatments and controls. We interpret the results as convincing 
evidence that the reform indeed raised the frequency of absence spells among pregnant wom-
en. All the 24 alternative specifications produce significant positive reform-effects for the 
treatment group. None of them produce significant results for the control group of non-
pregnant colleagues.  
                                                 
3 Daily entry rates are adjusted for weekdays, public holidays, and for first day after holidays. 11 
 
 
Figure 3. Regression discontinuity analysis. Estimated impact on absence incidence of remov-
ing firms’ pay liability (with 95 percent confidence intervals). 12 
 
Table2. Regression discontinuity analysis: Estimated impact on absence incidence of removing firms’ pay lia-
bility. By band width and time function specification (t-values in parentheses). Percentage points change. 
  Common time function  Separate time functions before/after 
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We now turn to a more detailed analysis of the reform effects based on a hazard rate 
model. In this exercise, we exploit a much larger time window (2001.5-2005.12), and base our 
inference on differences in the differences between the treatment and the control groups be-
fore and after the reform. Let P be an indicator variable denoting potential treatment (preg-
nancy), let R be an indicator denoting that the reform has been implemented (after April 1, 
2002), let D be an indicator denoting that the current state (presence or absence) has lasted 
less than 16 days, and let I be an indicator denoting that the last absence spell (if any) also 
lasted less than 16 days.
4 Furthermore, let  ,   9,8,...,2 j Pj  , be indicator variables denoting the 
number of months until expected  delivery for those who are pregnant. We write the hazard 
rate of moving from presence to absence as 
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4 The duration of absence spells is measured inclusive of days belonging to previous absence spells that 
were terminated less than 16 days prior to the start of a current spell. 13 
 
where xit is a vector of observed covariates and (v1i,v2i) are unobserved covariates.
5 Note that 
calendar time effects 12 (, ) tt   are estimated separately for each month, implying that any gen-
eral differences between the pre and post reform periods are absorbed by these effects. We 
also allow the effects of spell duration (less/more than 16 days) and the effects of recent ab-
senteeism (more/less than 16 days) to vary between the treatment and the control groups and 
between the pre and posts reform periods. The reform effects 11 12 21 22 (,,, )    are then iden-
tified by the shift in pregnant workers’ absence behavior from before to after the reform, rela-
tive to the control group members. An important assumption underlying this identification 
strategy is that the calendar time effects are the same for the treatment and the control groups. 
If pregnant workers have been subject to different time trends than non-pregnant workers for 
reasons that are not related to the reform, the estimated reform effects may be biased. We re-
turn to this issue below.  
  The model allows for four different reform effects. The first  11 ()  captures the effect of 
removing the firms’ pay liability on sick leave incidence. Since the reform clearly made sick 
leave less costly for the firms, we expect that 11 0   . The second effect  12 ()  captures the 
effect of the reform on incidences for which there was no pay liability either before or after 
the reform. Since the reform did not change the incentives for these events, we expect that
12 0   ( the inclusion of this term may thus be thought of as a sort of placebo test). The third 
effect  21 ()  captures the direct effect of removing the firms’ pay liability on the speed of re-
covery during the first 16 days of absence. Since the reform made it less costly to let the 
workers stay away from work in this period, we expect that 21 0   . The final effect  22 ()  cap-
tures the indirect effect of removing the firms’ pay liability on the speed of recovery after 16 
days of absence. Given that there was no pay liability after 16 days of absence either before or 
after the reform, the removal of pay liability did not affect firm incentives directly. However, 
since the removal of pay liability for shorter spells made it less risky for the firms to accept 
employees back into work (realizing that there is always a risk of relapse), we expect that
22 0   .      
To avoid setting up a model for the initial state, we condition on workers being present 
to start with; i.e., workers enter into the dataset at the first occasion of presence. To derive the 
                                                 
5 The vector of observed covariates includes age (34 dummy variables, corresponding to age 16-49), 
county (19 dummy variables), income (15 dummy variables), and education/industry (15 dummy variables). 14 
 
likelihood function for observed data, we split each individual’s event history into parts cha-
racterized by constant explanatory variables and unchanged state. Let  , 1,2 ki Sk   be the set of 
observed spell parts under risk of event k (sickness, recovery) for individual i. Let  kis l denote 
the observed length of each of the spell parts, and let the indicator variables  kis y denote wheth-
er a spell part at risk of transition k actually ended in such a transition or was right-censored. 
Conditional on unobserved heterogeneity, the likelihood function for individual i can then be 
written as 
 






12 11 1 1 1
21 2 12
(, ) ( ) ) e x p ( )






iii i tk i i s i tk i
sS
y
it ki is it ki
sS











Since the likelihood contribution in (3) contains unobserved variables, it cannot be 
used directly for estimation purposes. This problem may be solved by formulating a model for 
the distribution of unobserved variables and then replace Equation (3) with its expectation. In 
the present context, however, it may be important to avoid unjustified restrictions on the joint 
distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity. It it is probable that the unobserved characteris-
tic affecting absence incidence is correlated to that affecting recovery, implying that manipu-
lation of the inflow is also likely to change the distribution of unobserved recovery propensi-
ties in the stock of absentees. We thus model unobserved heterogeneity by means of a nonpa-
rametric approach. Under mild technical assumptions, results in Lindsay (1983, Theorem 3.1) 
and Heckman and Singer (1984, Theorem 3.5) ensure that for the purpose of maximizing the 
likelihood, the heterogeneity may be modeled by a discrete distribution without loss of gene-
rality. Let Q be the (a priori unknown) number of support points in this distribution and let 
  12 (, ) , ,  1 , 2 , . . . , ll l vv p l Q   be the associated location vectors and probabilities. In terms of 
observed variables, we write the likelihood function as  
  12 12
11 11
[ ( ,) ] ( ,) ,     1
i
QQ NN
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ll ii
L ELv v p Lv v p
 
    , (4) 
where   12 (, ) iii Lv v is given in Equation (3). Our estimation procedure is to maximize the like-
lihood function (4) with respect to all model and heterogeneity parameters repeatedly for al-
ternative values of Q. The non-parametric maximum likelihood estimators (NPMLE) are ob-
tained by starting out with Q=1, and then expanding the model with new support points until 
the model is “saturated” in the sense that it is no longer possible to increase the likelihood 15 
 
function by adding more points The preferred model is then selected on the basis of the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Monte Carlo evidence presented in Gaure, Røed and 
Zhang (2007) indicates that parameter estimates obtained this way are consistent and approx-
imately normally distributed. They also indicate that the standard errors conditional on the 
optimal number of support points are valid for the unconditional model as well, and hence can 
be used for standard inference purposes. 
Table 3. The estimated reform effects on absenteeism. Percent change in hazard rate (t-values in parentheses) 
Effect on incidences for which pay liability was removed 
11 ()    5.13*** 
(3.54) 
 
Effect on incidences for which pay liability did not apply  either before or after the reform




Effect on recovery during period for which pay liability was removed 
21 ()    -3.92** 
(-1.98) 
 
Effect on recovery during period for which pay liability did not apply either before or after 
the reform 




    
Number of estimated parameters  341   
Number of mass-points in heterogeneity distribution  11   
**(***) significant at 5(1) percent level. 
  The estimated reform effects based on the hazard rate model are presented in Table 3. 
The rate of entry into sick-leave spells that used to be subject to pay liability rose by around 5 
percent  11 ()  , while the recovery rate from the same spells dropped by around 4 percent 21 () . 
Moreover, the rate of recovery from spells that were not subject to pay liability either before 
or after the reform rose by as much as 9 percent  22 ()  . Finally, the rate of entry into spells 
that were exempted from pay liability prior to the reform was unaffected by it. All these re-
sults are exactly as one would expect on the basis of economic theory. Firms responded to the 
new incentives by reducing efforts to prevent short term absence, for which they no longer 
faced any direct costs. At the same time, they apparently became less skeptical towards allow-
ing long-term absent employees back into work, knowing that they no longer were responsi-
ble for the costs associated with relapses. It is of interest to note that the latter effect, accord-
ing to our point estimates, is sufficiently large to imply that the removal of firms’ pay liability 
actually caused the expected duration of a pregnant worker’s absence spell to drop by 4-5 
percent. Since it also raised the entry rate by around 5 percent, this implies that the effect on 
overall absenteeism of this particular reform was close to zero, consistent with the descriptive 
pattern conveyed by Figure 1 above. Hence, even though we have found that absenteeism is 
highly responsive to firm incentives, we also conclude that an initial pay liability period of 16 
days – which on average implies that firms’ cover around 34 percent of the absence costs for 16 
 
pregnant workers (Bjerkedal and Thune, 2003) – does not reduce overall absenteeism to any 
noticeable extent. This suggests that making firms financially responsible for short-term ab-
senteeism only is a highly inefficient way of structuring public sickness insurance programs.  
As discussed above, the results in Table 3 are based on the assumption that young non-
pregnant female colleagues constitute an appropriate control group for pregnant workers, in 
the sense that they were subject to the same time-variation in absence behavior apart from the 
reform. If pregnant workers changed their absence behavior relative to non-pregnant workers 
for reasons other than the reform, our estimates may be biased. Yet, while it is conceivable 
that idiosyncratic absence trends could explain the relative rise in entry rates and the decline 
in recovery rates among pregnant workers, it is hard to see why this should yield the particular 
twist in the recovery profiles captured by our estimates. We interpret the finding that the re-
covery rate declined during the first 16 days of absence (for which there used to be a pay lia-
bility period), while at the same time it rose at longer durations, as convincing evidence of a 
reform effect. To assess the robustness of our findings, we have also estimated a version of 
the hazard rate model with a separate linear time-trend for pregnant workers included in the 
model. What happens then is that the estimated reform-effects on entry and short term recov-
ery  11 21 (,)   becomes somewhat smaller and statistically insignificant, whereas the reform-
generated twist in the recovery profile remains equally large and statistically significant. Tak-
en together, we view the totality of our results, based on both the regression discontinuity de-
sign and difference-in-difference design, as convincing evidence that employer’s incentives 
do have a significant impact on employees’ absence behavior. 
4.2  Employment opportunities for young females 
The firms’ pay liability for pregnant workers’ absences was removed for the purpose of mak-
ing individuals conceived to have a high risk of becoming pregnant more employable. In this 
subsection, we evaluate whether the reform had this intended effect or not. Employers’ scope 
for discriminating against pregnant or pregnancy-prone workers is limited insofar as workers 
already are employed. Hence, to the extent that the higher expected absence costs associated 
with pregnancies affect employment opportunities at all, they are likely to do so primarily 
through the hiring decision. We therefore start out with the population of not-yet-employed 
graduates in this analysis; i.e., we include in the analysis persons who ended their educational 
career in the period from 2000 to 2004 without already having got a job three months prior to 
graduation.  17 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of data used to analyze transitions to employment 
   
Treatment A 
All young women 
 
Control A 





All other young 
women 
  Before After Before After Before After Before After 
No. graduates  48 461  50 623  48 850  53 050  6 278  5 883  42 183  44 740 
...included in sam-
ple after matching 
27 609  30 283  27 609  30 283  6 017  5 661  6 017  5 661 
...not employed 3 
months prior to 
graduation 
22 377  25 193  22 183  24 273  4 750  4 434  4 801  4 514 
          
Age  24.1 23.7 23.4 23.2 26.7 26.8 26.7 26.8 
E d u c a t i o n           
Compulsory or 
lower secondary   23.9 27.9  24  28.8 21.9 25.8 21.7 25.1 
Upper secondary  37.8 38.7 39.4 39.0 16.0 15.4 16.4 15.5 
College, low level  23.9 19.6 22.3 18.7 46.9 42.4 46.6 42.7 
College, high level  14.4 13.8 14.3 13.5 15.2 16.4 15.3 16.7 
Non-European 
background (%) 
6.9 7.5 7.9 8.0  11.9  13.6  5.1 6.0 
Outcome           
Fraction  employed            
…at    graduation   4.0 3.6 4.1 3.5 4.4 5.5 4.5 4.9 
...6  months  after  34.3 28.2 31.0 24.7 45.4 41.6 47.8 41.2 
...12  months  after 42.1 35.5 37.2 31.2 52.0 48.3 55.9 51.0 
 
We set up a duration model accounting for the transition to the first job. In this case, it 
is not obvious how the treatment group should be defined; and even less obvious how an ap-
propriate control group can be established. Loosely speaking, the treatment group consists of 
women at risk of becoming pregnant, which from the employer point of view basically in-
cludes all young women. As one alternative, we thus define all young women (aged 19-34) to 
be in the treatment group, whereas we use men in the same age group as controls. For each 
female graduate, we pick as control a male student who completed the same education at the 
same point in time (based on approximately 650 education-graduation-time groups). Since 
men and women tend to chose rather different educations, this procedure has the unfortunate 
consequence that we lose approximately 42 percent of the observations due to the lack of an 
appropriate control person (we return to this issue below). The approach also suffers from the 
potential problem that men and women have been subject to different trends in the school-to-
work transitions for reasons not related to the reform (although we do not see any particular 
reason why this should be the case, given that we have matched on education and graduation 
time). Hence, we also define a much more narrow treatment group, namely newly married 
women (less than four years ago) with less than 3 children, whereas we use a matched com-
parison group of other young women (aged 19-34) as controls. In this analysis, only a very 
small number of observations are lost due to lack of appropriate controls. But, while this latter 18 
 
approach ensures more similar treatment and controls, it also suffers from contamination bias 
generated by the fact that even the controls are really treated to some extent, in the sense that 
employers may consider their probability of becoming pregnant as strictly positive. Descrip-
tive statistics for the two treatment and control groups are provided in Table 4. The statistical 
model we use to examine the transition to and the duration of employment is similar to the 
one we used in the previous subsection to evaluate the transition to and the duration of sick 
leave. The school-to-work hazard is specified as 
  33 3 3 3 3 3 3 (,)e x p ( ) , it it i it k t d i x vx T T R v             (5)
where T is the treatment group dummy and  3d   are monthly spell duration parameters, mea-
suring the time since graduation.
6 The setup of the likelihood function is completely parallel 
to Equations (3) and (4); hence, we do not repeat the derivation here. 
Table 5. The estimated reform effect on the school-to-work transition. Percent change in hazard rate  
(t-values in parentheses) 
   
Treatment: Young women 
Control: Young men 
Treatment: Newly married 
young women 











Effect on transition to employment 








        
Number of estimated parameters  109  98  107  98 
Number of mass-points in heterogeneity dis-
tribution  2 2 2  3 
*** Significant at 1 % level.  
Table 5 reports the estimated effects. The main results, reported in Columns I and III, 
seem to indicate that the reform did make it easier for “pregnancy-prone” graduates to obtain 
a first job. Using young men as controls, we find that the reform raised the transition rate into 
a first job by as much as 8.7 percent. The effect is significant, both from economic and statis-
tical viewpoints. When we only include newly married women in the treatment group and use 
other young women as controls, the estimated effect drops to 4.0 percent and also becomes 
statistically insignificant. Given the contamination bias caused by the obvious pregnancy-risk 
among the controls, however, we should indeed expect a smaller effect estimate from this 
model. To evaluate the robustness of our findings, particularly with respect to the risk of di-
verging trends in hazard rates for reasons not related to the reform, we also estimate the two 
                                                 
6 The vector of control variables xit for the male-female comparison includes separate age dummy va-
riables for men and women (34 dummy variables, 17 for each gender corresponding to age 18-34), educational 
attainment (14 dummy variables), nationality (3 dummy variables), and indicators for pregnancy at three differ-
ent stages before/after the reform (6 dummy variables). 19 
 
models with a more narrow time window, i.e., 2001-2003. The results, reported in Columns II 
and IV, are very similar to the main results, although the statistical uncertainty obviously in-
creases. Finally, given the large number of observations that were lost in the male-female 
comparison due to the matching requirements, we also estimate a model using the complete 
set of observations for young men and young women, where we, instead of matching on edu-
cation and graduation-time, control for education/graduation-time by means of 632 additional 
indicator variables (and thus use all observations). Again, the estimates are similar to the main 
results (not shown in the table); for the complete sample, the estimated reform effect is 6.8 
percent (t-value 3.8). For the reduced sample (2001-2003), the estimated effect is 6.6 percent 
(t-value 2.8).  
In order to assess whether it became easier for actually pregnant workers to find work 
after the reform, we also included in the model indicators for pregnancy (at three different 
stages) and interacted them with the reform dummy variable. If there was an effect of the 
reform on employment opportunities for pregnant workers, we should clearly expect it to be 
largest in the beginning of the pregnancy, since there are then still many potential sickness 
months left to pay for that could be affected by the reform. The point estimates that came out 
of this exercise indeed indicated a small favorable reform-effect early in the pregnancy, whe-
reas the effect turned negative towards the end of the pregnancy. But the standard errors were 
large for this exercise, and none of the estimates were statistically significant.  
5  Conclusion 
The findings reported in this paper show that employees’ sick leave behavior is highly res-
ponsive towards the employer’s wage costs during their absence. If the costs can be passed on 
to a public insurer, employees tend to be more absent than if the costs are paid for by their 
own employer. In most countries, the employer is responsible for the costs associated with 
short-term absence, while the public insurer covers the costs arising from long-term absence. 
We have shown that this system reduces the incidence of absence spells and also raises the 
probability of a quick recovery. At the same time, however, it also significantly reduces the 
recovery rate at durations exceeding the pay liability period. We conclude that responsibility 
for short-term absenteeism only undermines the firms’ incentives to prevent long-term absen-
teeism; not only because they have little pecuniary incentives to avoid long-term absence per 
se, but also because a long-term absent worker’s return to work entails the risk of costly short-
term relapses (for which the employer is again financially responsible). As a result, employers 20 
 
exert too little effort to prevent long-term absence The evidence presented in this paper indi-
cates that the unintended side effect of restricting pay liability to short-term absence spells 
only – in terms of raising longer term absenteeism – is substantial. According to the findings 
presented in this paper, they are sufficiently large to nullify the favorable impacts of a 16 day 
pay liability period for short-term absenteeism. Hence, despite making the employers respon-
sible for a large fraction of overall sickness absence costs , pay liability for short-term absence 
achieves virtually nothing in terms of reduced overall absenteeism. We simply get less short-
term absenteeism and more long-term absenteeism. Given that long-term absence spells is the 
typical gateway to permanent disability benefits in many countries (including Norway), insuf-
ficient employer incentives to prevent long-term absenteeism may be very costly from a social 
point of view. 
Why, then, have so many countries designed their sickness insurance systems such 
that employers do not face any of the costs associated with long-term absenteeism? We see 
two possible explanations. The first is that absence behavior has typically been considered to 
be determined by the worker – not the firm. Hence, the focus has been placed on worker-
incentives, rather than firm-incentives. Second, there may be significant administrative costs 
associated with reimbursing firms for the large number of short-term absences, implying that 
even a modest pay liability for longer absence spells is difficult to implement without at the 
same time raising the overall sick-leave costs for firms, and consequently undermine em-
ployment prospects for job seekers with high expected absence propensity. The results pre-
sented in this paper show that the first argument is not valid; firms’ do have a lot of influence 
on their employees’ absence behavior, and they respond to economic incentives. The second 
argument, however, is apparently valid. Our findings indicate that firms may respond to sick 
leave pay liability by being less willing to employ workers expected to be much absent due to 
sickness. Hence, by raising pay liability for long-term absences without at the same time re-
ducing it for shorter spells, policy makers may undermine incentives to employ marginal 
workers. A possible solution to this dilemma may be to restructure firms’ pay liability, so that 
they cover a smaller fraction of the short-term absence costs and a larger fraction of the long-
term absence costs. If only transaction costs (associated with a larger number of insurance 
reimbursements) stand in the way of such a solution, one may hope that modern technology 
will reduce or even eliminate this obstacle. 21 
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